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Law, Justice and Education
BY JAMES AHERN

Educators and their intellectual community play a vital role in the
leadership of our country. They are the spearhead of progressive
thought, and provide the ideas that form the foundation of public
policies.
A lot has been said recently about our colleges and the people
who populate them. The wave of student energy that emerged in the
sixties, fresh and constructive, seemed to degenerate into violence and
despair, and more recently into dulling apathy and cynicism. M any
people say that the so-called student movement is over, that the
energy has been dissipated and things are now getting back to normal.
I hope they're wrong. The fresh and innovative interest of our young
people in public policy is not just a good thing ... it is a necessary
and integral part of the movement for effective political and social
reform in our country. We cannot afford to return to the old complacency. We must rather keep this energy going, and use it to construct new and better public institutions.
The role of our educators in this venture is, as it has always been,
one of leadership. It is up to the educators to nurture and channel
constructive public interest; both to avoid the violent confrontations
of the past, and to build a new cooperation for the future. The weaknesses in our institutions have been graphically portrayed, and now a
process of revitalization must begin. From my perspective, the need
for reform is nowhere more urgent than in the task of revitalizing
our cities.
Few institutions are as debased as municipal government. Much
has been made recently of the decline of m achine politics, but in city
after city, the disappearance of a dominant political figure has not
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been followed by a broadening of political participation or any greater responsiveness to the needs of the public. Government policy in
most American cities is still largely determined by favoritism and
political patronage.
Graft and corruption are a fact of life in most cities today. This
in turn sets the stage for the manipulation of city government by organized crime. Gambling, prostitution, and the widespread sale of
illicit drugs are just not possible without the tacit cooperation of public
officials.
With government thus weakened, it is hardly surprising that municipal agencies cannot adequately carry out their vital functions. Education, transportation, and sanitation are all failing simultaneously to
meet even the most basic needs of our cities.
Nowhere is this failure more evident than in the response of public officials to organized dissent. As a former police officer who is still
active in law enforcement, I have been witness to many of the bitter
events of the past decade. And in too many cases there has been a
critical failure of leadership on the part of politicians, university officials, and law enforcement officers. Too often their behavior in time
of crisis is characterized by mutual distrust and parochial institutional
pride. City governments are secretive towards universities, and the universities in turn stand aloof from their urban surroundings. Police
agencies co-exist sullenly with one another and with the institutions
they are sworn to protect.
We can no longer rely on inspired improvisation to carry us through
times of crisis. The price of failure is likely to be bloodshed in the
short run-and in the long run, increasing repression and polarization.
The only effective solution is to change the institutions themselves.
To begin with, we must recognize that we are today facing a national crisis of trust in our criminal justice system.
Our police, in particular, are in trouble. And they're in trouble
largely because of what we ask them to do. We ask them to fight
crime in the streets, but at the same time we expect them to issue
parking tickets and traffic citations. We expect them to keep the
streets free of drunks and keep order under every conceivable circumstance. We expect them to pound a beat checking doorknobs and
windows. W even expect them to guard manhole covers and chauffeur public officials. And then we wonder why they seem to be fighting a losing battle against rising crime.
The policeman of the past was in many ways a reflection of the
community he served. Today this is not the case. Not only is he typically white while serving a black community, but at a time when half
our young people are going to college, he generally holds only a high
school diploma.
Frequently, he is handcuffed by the very politicians who cry the
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loudest for law and order. Appointments and promotions are typically based on political considerations, and enforcement policies are
often determined the same way. The policeman learns quickly when
to make an arrest and when to look the other way, whom he must
help and whom he can safely ignore.
He is at once the pawn of politicians and the target of a troubled
society. Although police are certainly not without their problems and
-like other public institutions-have made mistakes. They have also
taken a great deal of undeserved blame. Few of us realize that when
a police department is called to the scene of disorder, the situation is
usually already out of hand. And notwithstanding the crash training
programs and other emergency measures taken by police in recent
years, their very presence at such times often acts as a catalyst for
violence.
It is true that police find it difficult to play an impartial role in
such situations, and that too few understand their duty to protect the
rights of peaceful assembly and protest. Instead, there is a tendency
for police to see themselves as protectors of values and ideals that
appear to be threatened, with the result that force may be used where
none 1s necessary.
However, we proved during the May Day demonstrations in New
Haven two years ago that police can play an impartial role which allows them both to protect the right of dissent and at the same time
fulfill their obligation to protect their lives and property. We can expect more of our policemen if we support them not with slogans, but
with the training they need to perform their increasingly complex
and diverse tasks. Most policemen, even high-ranking supervisors,
have no real grounding in management techniques. Many police
chiefs get no training at all beyond what they received as rookie
policemen. In Connecticut, this adds up to only 200 hours of instructions. Compare that with the 1,200 hours required by law for a licensed beautician.
We need more college-trained police officers. By this I do not
simply mean technical police training labeled as higher education.
Police work can benefit greatly from the liberalizing of thought that
results from a good undergraduate education.
Police departments also need highly-trained researchers, planners,
trainers, and administrative staff members.
Above all, police need to acquire a sense of professional responsibility. The President's Commission on Campus Unrest recommended
the establishment of a national organization to promote police professionalism and provide support for local departments striving to meet
the challenge of radical chance. More importantly, the organization
would establish national standards for police conduct and ethics similar to those for doctors and lawyers. It might also recommend pro-
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cedures for investigating abuses and for disciplining those who violate
its standards. And it would serve as a counter-balance to the political
influences impeding police professionalism on the local level.
Another key to resolving the crisis in our criminal justice system
is the reform of our courts.
At present, we are saddled with a system which doesn't work for
anybody. It doesn't work for the prosecutor who must let a rapist
plead guilty to a lesser charge because of clogged court calendars. It
doesn't work for the defendant who can't afford bail and often sits
in jail for months awaiting trial. And it doesn't work for the average
citizen who is victimized again and again by criminals who are turned
loose on the streets. Instead of a fair and speedy trial, we have revolving-door justice which does away with the defendant's right to
a trial and often does away with the public's right to protection from
violence.
This pattern can be changed if we give our courts some help. The
Constitution guarantees a speedy trial, and we ought to be able to
deliver it within 90 days. To do it, we'll need more courts and we'll
need better courts. If we're going to promote policemen on the basis
of merit, we should do the same for judges. They should be appointed
on the basis of their professional competence and their commitment
to equal justice-not on the basis of their loyalty to the party in
power.
If a man is found guilty of a crime, it is the responsibility of the
criminal justice system to do something about it. In the past, we have
built walls around our problems and hoped they would go away. But
they haven't gone away. Eighty per cent of those sentenced to prison
come out to commit more serious crimes than the ones they were
sentenced for in the first place. Somehow we have devised a monster
system which turns first-time offenders into hardened criminals at the
taxpayers expense.
Part of the problem is that we haven't really decided whether we
want to punish the criminal for what he's already done or try to make
sure he never does it again. If we're really concerned about combatting crime, the answer seems clear. Ninety-five per cent of the men in
prison will eventually get out, and it is in our own best interest to
see that they return as productive members of society. Why spend
thousands of dollars to shut a man away in a medieval dungeon when
he can be maintained at much less cost in local correctional facilities
which allow him to hold down an outside job and establish ties with
the community.
These are a few of the steps we can take to alleviate the crisis in
our criminal justice system, but they will require a new and altogether different kind of leadership. We can no longer be satisfied with
grand gestures and empty rhetoric while crime continues to spiral up-
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ward. The fact is that tough talk never stopped a mugger, and no
murder was ever solved by juggling crime statistics. People are still
afraid to walk the streets-and for good reason.
The power of organized crime is incredible, yet no public leader
seems to consider it an issue worthy of national concern. We've seen
mayors in two Eastern cities indicted for their actions on behalf of
organized crime. We've seen Mafia meat operations drive up the
price of beef by 15% in New York City in the face of federal price
controls. We've seen a bloodbath in New York resulting in the deaths of
innocent bystanders.
Even more ominous is the flow of mob money into the coffers of
our political leaders and the resulting manipulation of our police
departments.
Organized crime is responsible for virtually all the narcotics traffic
in this country. Fully half of all the muggings, the beatings, and the
purse snatchings are directly related to the use of drugs. A federallyfinanced program of national drug rehabilitation would certainly help,
but the fact is we already have a well-organized heroin maintenance
program run by organized crime. The only difference is that the fixes
are delivered on a street corner instead of a hospital, and the addicts
wind up in a gutter instead of at a job.
These are some of the most prevalent factors contributing to the
problems of crime and violence in our society. What they suggest
finally is that piecemeal reaction to symptoms will not be successful.
We must also reject the empty political rhetoric and misguided policies of the past, and start making some fundamental structural reforms in our institutions of criminal justice. Blaming crime and violence on permissive judges or on long-haired kids will get us nowhere.
Our institutions or criminal justice have to be re-built, and it will
take all the youthful energy and interest all of us can muster to do
the job. The need is obvious. There is really no choice. Our institutions can be made to work. And, as always, educators can help to
lead us along that path.

James Ahern is the former Chief of Police of New Haven, Connecticut, and a member of the President's Commission on Campus
Unrest He was a featured speaker at the Annual Meeting of AGLS
at Rochester Institute of Technology, October 26-28, 1972.
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Violence and Technology
The first part of this topic seems to asswne a great deal-that
technology causes violence. The implied assumption seems to be that
the more technological a society, the more prone it is to violence. I
would contend that this is a reasonable assumption. We are well along
the road to being the foremost industrialized society on this planet, and
"law and order" is a topic uppermost in our minds. It is certainly
one of the major issues of the current Presidential campaign. Coupled
with the propensity of people to view life from their own parochial
vantage point, the mass media has brought before our very eyes the
simple fact that the streets of America's major cities are no longer
safe; it has shown on instant replay such exciting events as political
assassinations, urban riots, 1972 Olympic kidnappings, military combat and campus disorders. Other countries besides the United States
have witnessed rising crime statistics as they move away from an
agrarian base and toward an industrialized social structure. The level
of violence varies, however, and in some societies it is considerably
less than others. The reasons for this variance are hard to ascertain;
but, I suspect, those reasons are of crucial importance if we are to
fathom this subject.
For Americans the crime news is quite bitter because it shows a
significant and steady increase in the past 25 years with some ebbing
now and again, but with an average gain of 15% a year. Violent
crimes rose at a more rapid rate ('17%) than crime against property,
a less propitious (9%) rate. Over the past decade the American crime
rate rose 148%; the population rose but 10%.
Critics find that such statistics should not be trusted. Some feel
128

the statistics gathered and released solely by the F.B.I. are played
down when they show a distressingly sharp upbeat. Others counter
such accusations by stating that the gatherers of crime information
prejudice the process by overrating and double counting. The whole
question of statistical gathering is a legitimate topic to investigate.
Even the 1969 staff report on "Crimes of Violence" acknowledged
that crime figures should be viewed cautiously.I Based on voluntary
disclosures by local police, these statistics are imperfect measures of
the actual levels and trends of violent crimes in the United States.
However, the sad fact of life is that given the gap that exists between the reported figures and true figures, and the attendant problems
of dealing with statistics, in all probability, there is some substance to
the contention that the true rate of major violent crimes as well as
serious property crimes is twice as high as the reported rate.
One does not want to get bogged down arguing how rapid the
water is seeping into the boat. An overview of the situation is that the
rate of violent crime is increasing faster than the population growth
rate and has been since the turn of the century and the future trend
is unmistakenly foreboding.
Technology has demonstrated its proclivity (in all industrializing
societies) to ailter the culture of a society so that violence does increase. The reasons for this cause and effect relationship vary. However, consider the members of a Puerto Rican family who had lived
in a small rural village with a close, intimate social structure virtually unchanged over the past century. Then, abruptly, move that family
via a Pan American jet to the whirling, aggressive, cut-throat competitive environment of New York City's garment district where the
mother, father and oldest chi'ldren have found employment. The leap
from the lazy, placid, rural countryside of Puerto Rico to the bustling,
teeming city of New York represents one of man's most ambitious
and unpredictable adventures-the poorly understood process of cultural evolution know as "acculturation." This process includes not
only the process of contact between differing cultures, but also the
infinite range of social resu'1ts such as assimilation, rejection and disorganization. The attendant feelings of depression, frustration, alienation and increased violence are an all too familiar a pattern for those
who try to make the leap. The social controls that proved workable
in the old setting are no longer relevant in the new cultural setting.
Even a casual observer can understand the difficulties of adjusting
to such cultural differences that a new, bewildering, New York City
presents to the Puerto Rican family.
Today, those of us who have been brought up in an industrialized
1 Eisenhower, Milton S., "Crimes of Violence," National Commission on the
Causes and Prevention of Violence, (Washington: United States Printing Office,
1970).
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modem society can and should consider ourselves changing natives,
better able to cope with acculturation than most, but still not that
comfortable with the process. Although we may feel a greater familiarity with the technological terrain than the newly arrived Puerto Rican
family, we are in the midst of the rapid cultural change and stand on
the threshold of a new culture. Much of this change is due to the technologies that have been and will be unleashed. The future holds much
that is unpredictable. Even those who would dare to dream of what
this future might be, as Allen Toffier has done in Future Shock, have
hardly the foggiest idea of how accurate their predictions are apt to
be. The incredible promise (or is it threat?) is that what science and
technology are likely to realize within a few decades is apt to be
dramatic and almost unpredictable. One thing is for sure, however.
Our own acculturation to technological advances is among the most
meaningful and personally vital tasks of our time. Acculturation will
occur. The question is whether it wi,JJ harmonize with man's vital
interests. Ever more people are answering this question in a pessimistic
manner, especially when they view the area of violence and see it increasing at an accelerated rate as the changes in our society also accelerate. The culprit seems to be change: Not the slow evolutionary
type of change where people have time to adjust, but the more rapid
change brought on by constant alterations due to technology. The human lag in adjusting to rapid change is causing increased tension which
all too frequentJly manifests itself in a severe form of anxiety-violence.
There is a long history of thought in this area. The societal tensions that accompany the western industrial revolution were interrupted by both optimistic and pessimistic thinkers of those times in
ways roughly analogous to the thinkers we hear today. One can trace
the view of technology as a utopian force to such 19th-century philosophers as Karl Marx and Auguste Comte. On the other side, one may
cite numerous critics of machine technology including Thomas Carlyle
who wrote of "An Age of Machinery, in Every Inward and Outward
Sense of the Word," the poet Matthew Arnold; and even Mark
Twain, who late in his life offered a little-known essay entitled "Man
A Machine?" Among those whose fear of, and resistance to, technological change impelled them to action were a considerable number of
English workers known as Luddites, who in the early 19th century
gained wide repute by smashing the machines they hated in a series
of riots. The violence of these riots was caused by the societal ramifications of technological innovations, namely, unemployment.
Another interesting and more optimistic of our contemporary
thinkers is Marshall McLuhan, who sees technology as the prime
mover behind a,ll social change but does little to concern himself with
where technology is leading. His book Understanding Media presents
a theme that places the content of a discussion over technology in
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moral neutrality. It is the changes produced in ourselves that are important. His cry is not that of great alarm. On the other side, the
pessimistic writings of men like Herbert Marcuse view the technological system as creating in individuals "false needs" which serve
to sustain the system while repressing true human needs. Marcuse's
One-Dimensional Man is a major work of contemporary philosophy
which conciludes that the technological state is basically totalitarian
and violent. From the inside, it appears completely rational; but from
the outside, one can see that it is totally irrational since it excludes
qualitative social change.
Whether you subscribe to such notions or not, it is unmistakably
true that today, and increasingly in the future, the social processes
will become so complex, so interrelated and so tied up in scientific
technological developments, that the average collective mind of mankind will be more baffled, confused and, consequently, unresponsive.
Frustration and cynicism are building and violence is mounting. In
ages past, before rapid technological innovation, the social processes
were relatively clear. Value structures were understood and generally
accepted. Power usually rested in the hands of a small oligarchy via
the state, the church or the military. People knew who their rulers
were, what they were doing and why. For the industrialized nations,
this era has passed. Today, people are not sure what is happening,
or why. It is one of the paradoxes of the modem age that more and
more people, generally less knowledgeable, are encouraged to participate in the decision-making process. Ironically, at the same time, the
problems of modern industrialized society are growing in complexity
and will, in all probability, be understood by few people. How does this
technological force square with the social trend toward participatory
democracy? The answer is, it doesn't, and the ramifications of this
dichotomy are very apt to lend to more violence.
The unprecedented state of chaos, confusion and violence we see
are not only a result of our rapid change, but also the result of our
psychological failing to grow up to this change. In our medicine, our
science, our technology we make rapid strides to adapt ourselves to
new techniques and solutions. But in our thinking, our feeling, our
accommodation to social, political, cultural and economic problems,
we remain enslaved to tribal memories. We may physically leave a
pastoral setting such as Puerto Rico, but the cultural changes that are
necessary for our existence and survival in a constantly changing
technological society suffer from a cultural lag. This is no less true
for those of us who have grown up in a technological setting. Only
the magnitude of the impact varies. Dislocations appear everywheregeneration gaps, credibility gaps, gaps between rich and poor, male
and female. It is hard and painful to grow up individually. It is even
harder and more painful for a whole society to grow up, especially
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when you don't know what you are growing up to. The guideposts for
social interaction and human behavior are ruptured while at the same
time, people are expected without difficulty to throw off early prejudices and preconceptions, to take a realistic look at what is happening
in the world. Unless we can control and subdue the obsolete influences of the past, we shall have less and less control over the future.
Ironically, we are less sure of exactly what needs to be subdued and
what needs to be retained, for we are not sure wha t tools will be
needed in the future as the future remains primarily a mystery. If this
seems like a vicious cycle, it is. This does not mean we are in short
supply of soothsayers. There are many who offer simplistic answers.
However, no simplistic answer will solve the predicament of knowing
what traditions to keep on our perilous future voyage, especially when
we have no exact notion of what our future needs are to be.
One thing is quite evident: For the first time in our global history,
man has the technology, the energy, the knowledge and the resources
to unify the human race, to feed everyone, to provide all with at least
the basic necessities of life. Yet, while all this is possible on the technological and intellectual fronts, precisely the opposite is happening
on the political, social and the emotional fronts. The world's technological hardware is fast outstripping the average mental powers of
society to cope. All trends seem to indicate that only a small elite
minority will be able to understand the processes by which the human
population is maintained. And if these processes cannot be understood by the average man, how can the society make any rational and
democratic decisions on basic matters? The whale issue of whether a
democracy can survive in an age of dramatic and kaleidoscopic change
where more control becomes imperative is a major question that must
be tackled. In all probability, democracy will come under attack as
being an inadequate means of governing mass, technological society.
Personally, I wish to resist this snobbish elitist notion from the start,
but I fear for the future attack that is to be made on democracy.
More recently a growing number of people are not so sure this
technologicaJl revolution truly represents progress. More pessimistic
philosophies seem to be emerging. The same fossil fuels that launched
the industrial revolution are choking people and plants to death; the
same agricultural chemicals that enabled a small and shrinking percentage of our population to feed the rest of us are beginning to show
up in some odd places with strange effects; modern plumbing has
merely delivered the waste of the city dweller to the streams and
beaches of his country neighbors; weaponry has been created with
such destructive force that global annihilation is a very real possibility.
The technologically created affluence has, to many people, brought
poison instead of milk and honey, slavery instead of freedom, violence
instead of brotherhood.
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What people are beginning to realize is that technology can be a
two-edged sword cutting against social benefit as well as for it. Now
being perceived with considerably more clarity is the fact that technological achievements have been associated with and have considerable impact on social organizational systems of comparable complexity
and sophistication.
The idolatry of technology may be becoming a bit tarnished, but
the tendency is still to deify, to regard technology as an almost sentient agency in society with a will of its own, imposing its methods and
mechanisms on at best a passive and at worst an unwilling mankind.
There is a widespread feeling today that technology is, in fact, an
autonomous force largely out of control, and that the problem, therefore, is primarily one of gaining control. Yet, the instruments for control do not yet seem to be devised . The flywheel of technology has a
self-perpetuating momentum of its own, causing a frightening spinoff that vastly affects the social scene and, because of its huge impact,
contributes heavily to social instability and the accompanying heightened tempo of violence.
The American people are in trouble today not just because of the
severity of their problem, but because the yardstick for measuring and
dealing with change is breaking down. The need for change is not
the sole issue. The main issue is that too few are willing to stand by
any governing principles having to do with change. The results are a
bumbling amateurism in dealing with historical processes.
Passion is a valuable ingredient of change, but if it is detached altogether from knowledge and the making of objective judgments, the
result is likely to be a bloodly spew. Conflicting and competing claims
on the public attention for support are as natural as claims on the
public treasury, but these claims become random and explosive in the
absence of a responsible basis for evaluating them and fitting them
into the essential business of the whole community.
Kaleidoscopic change, due mainly to technology, has caused a
never-ending series of social reverberations which have displaced our
value structure. The problem of acculturation is enormous because
we no longer know what values are appropriate to deal with change.
So long as excuses are made for excesses, there will be a multiplication of excesses and a shrinkage in the chances for any basic upgrading in the human situation. The trouble with "bum, baby, bum,"
as an ideology is that babies do get burned. The slaughter of the innocent is what happens when know-nothingness and vengeance
converge.
The oldest political truth is that the only ultimate protection
against generalized violence is the particularized pursuit of justice.
The nation must therefore fix its main attention and energies on responsible and effective ways of dealing with the grievances and dreams
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of its people. This difficult task is compounded by the continual alteration that technology wroughts on a society. Society must not be
deflected from this purpose by those who attach fuses to those grievances or dreams. Nor can it grant special dispensation for violence to
any of its members. Until a system of values is created that will allow
social justice to be obtained and held, technology will continue to
play havoc with the social structure and violence wiH abound. Eventually, if unchecked, lack of an ethical basis will, in all probability, lead
to a massive blood bath. A non-violent responsible society cannot exist
without standards any more than it can advance without goals. The
standards once achieved must be applied with understanding and compassion but first there must be an acceptable base that is not continuously changing.
John Humphries
College of General Studies
Rochester Institute of Technology
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A test pilot, radioing to his control tower:
"I'm lost, but I'm making record time."
The vast successes of technology in the United States have produced a society in which techniques or the means is more important,
often, than the end product or goal. The artist reflects this dominance
by portraying in his work the products of technology or by emphasizing the creative act for its own sake. In either case, the art created
tends to have violence as its subject matter or it is in some way violent
itself.
The limits of my study are the works of five major writers and
painters active during the years 1920-1960: Nathaniel West, Stuart
Davis, Joseph Heller, Ernest Hemingway, and Jackson Pollock. This
is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment of American artistic endeavor during this period; I am sure that other writers and painters
will occur to you that would fit into this study. In fact, I would
count that as a measure of its success. My conclusions today must be
regarded as explorations in a vast but exciting area of American culture. And in an age when we emphasize the vernacular, the art of the
people, pop culture if you will, I am probably treading on dangerous
ground by limiting myself to the products of "high culture." But as
the song says-"Let it be." There is plenty of work for everyone.
Ed. note: This article is an abridgment of the original paper which was
nearly twice as long and included 35mm slides.
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American artists of the period 1920-1960 have responded both
directly and indirectly to their technological environment. By "direct
response," I am thinking of the artist's use of the technological world
as subject matter. Nathaniel West, in Miss Lonelyhearts ( 1933), portrayed the results of applying technology to the solution of human
problems-systematized counselling. A New York newspaper publishes an advice column, under the signature of Miss Lonelyhearts,
and the columnist, whom we know only as Miss Lonelyhearts, an indication that only his technological identity is of any importance,
experiences the excruciating and frustrating difficulty of dealing with
human problems in this mechanical way.1 The syndicated, systematized, technologically inspired solution to human problems is far from
adequate. It does not relieve the suffering of the correspondents and
it only creates an intolerable anxiety in the sensitive columnist.
The painter Stuart Davis was perhaps more confident in his treatment of the technological world. The semi-abstract, mechanical world
in his paintings is well known. Not so well known is his propensity for
systematization, for technology. His notes for the preparation of the
big murals of 1939 and 1940 demonstrate his desire to systematize
the creative process. The resultant art is clean, mechanical, animated,
nervous, sometimes humorous, usually forceful. He was totally committed to the creative act, which was necessarily for him quite subjective. The creative act results in constructive order, which he insisted was not merely subjective but external and universal.2
Joseph Heller, in Catch-22 ( 1955-1961), portrayed the world of
Milo Minderbinder's technology. In what is otherwise largely an insane world, Milo's methods are seen as relatively rational. He uses
the technological monster, the B-17 war machine, for distribution of
goods that are the basis of his eminently profitable enterprise. He is
the apostle of applied technology as well as the provider of fresh
eggs--corporation eggs- for the mess halls.3
These three artists portrayed technology in urban America (West),
in a relatively abstract, indeterminant world (Davis), and in a wartime environment (Heller). Each artist shows the influence of technology by dealing with it directly, as the subject matter of his art.
A more indirect response to technology is represented by Ernest
Hemingway and Jackson Pollock. Both of these artists emphasized the
essence of technology----ordered action as an end in itself. In Hemingway's work, action is all. In In Our Time ( 1925), he described his
world just before, during, and after World War I. In this world, tradi1 Nathaniel West, Miss, Lonelyhear.ts & The Day of the Locust (New York:
New Directions, 1962), p. 1.
2 Paintings by Davis used as illustration: Hot Still Scape for Six Colors
(1940); Report from Rockport (1940); Ursine Park (1942) .
3 Joseph Heller, Catch-22 (London: The Reprint Society, 1962), p . 126.
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tion was inverted; disorder was the rule. The only solid ground his
characters have to stand on is the pure act. Only action that is unencumbered with false principles (what he calls in A F,arewell to Arms
"obscene abstractions") can be creative. The order achieved in "Big
Two-Hearted River" is limited to simple action, on the lowest level.
Nick enjoys the act of cooking and of fishing, with no appa rent more
lasting end. This is comparable to the deifica tion of technology, the
system, the means to an end. Call it coping, if you will. And if this is
what the good life consists of-mere coping-then Herbert Muller
may be quite correct in labeling our conception of the good life as
generally paltry.4
Jackson Pollock, in his paintings, demonstrated a similar commitment to action, but with Pollock it was the creative act that was of
primary importance. The process of painting, the action of painting, is
primary. (Hence the phrase action painting.) " My painting does not
come from the easel. I hardly ever stretch my canvas before painting.
I prefer to tack the unstretched canvas to the hard wall or floor. I
need the resistence of a hard surface. On the floor I can walk round
it, work from the four sides and literally be in the painting."5
Thus, the artist may directly portray the technological world in
his art, as in the case of West, Davis, and Heller. Or he may respond
indirectly with emphasis upon the essence of technology: ordered action for its own sake, as is evident in the work of Hemingway and
Pollock.
But the next question is: given this description of the influence of
technology, does the art itself turn out to be violent? [Let us use this
definition of violence: narrowly, "behavior designed to inflict physical
injury to people or damage to property,"6 or more generally, destructive acts. A secondary, but quite common usage of the term is to denote the application of severe force or merely frenetic activity, in
neither case necessarily destructive.]
The art of the three writers in this study is characterized by violence (i.e., destructive acts). Hemingway's In Our Time portrays
violence both in wartime situations and in peacetime. In "The Battler," a story of peacetime, Nick Adams happens upon two apparent
hoboes, one an ex-prizefighter, Ad Francis, and the other, a Negro
named Bugs. Nick inadvertently annoys Ad, enough to cause Ad to
begin to gather his strength to start punching Nick. But Ad's friend
4 Herbert J. Muller, The Children of Frankenstein: A Primer on Modern
Tec,hnology and Hu,man Values (Bloomington, Ind.: Indian University Press,
1970), p. 5.
5 Paintings by Pollock used as illustration: One (1950) and Lavender Mist,
( 1950).
6 Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, Violence in America : Historical and Comparative Perspectives (New York: Bantam Books, 1969 ), p.
XXX.

136

.and caretaker intervenes, by cracking him on the head with a black
jack, "to change him when he gets that way."7 This episode demonstrates the violence as well as the inversion of the relationship between
the fighter Ad Francis and his friend Bugs. Bugs handles Ad as if
he were the operator of a machine. And "operation" is all; there is
nothing beyond tha t for Bugs. But Bugs is kind and considerate.
There is a feeling of brotherhood here. But the point is that the idea
of the good life is so "paltry." Ad Francis will not be cured; his
daily existence will be tolerable ; Ad and Bugs will cope.
Nathaniel West's M iss Lonelyhearts portrays the violence that results when other means fail for Miss Lonelyhearts, in his quest for
order in his life. When he cannot get through to Betty, he forces a
kiss, he shouts at her, he tugs roughly at her nipple, he threatens her.
After all this, Betty says to him: "What's the matter? . . . Are you
sick?"8 For Miss Lonelyhearts, violence is a refrain that must keep
returning, because no other action is effective, no other action
communicates.
Joseph Heller's Catch-22 portrays the meaningless violence of war.
Values are inverted in such a way that the commercial necessities of
Milo's corporation dictate the operation of the war itself. The ultima te inversion of values occurs when Milo arranges (for the good of
the corporation) to have an American base bombed, by the corporation bombers.
Other products of these artists portray severe force, or frenetic
activity, not necessarily destructive, but labeled commonly as violent
action. Stuart Davis' paintings of around 1940, and indeed nearly all
of his la ter work, demonstrate the vigorous organization of what appear to be machine-made parts. There is a felt unity in his paintings,
but also the tension of a contained potential explosion, as if the
components of the paintings are about to burst apart.
Jackson Pollock's paintings of 1950 a re violent in their very execution. " When I am in my painting, I'm not aware of what I'm
doing. It is only after a sort of 'get acquainted' period that I see what
I have been about."9 Still, even with this emphasis upon the act of
p ainting itself, comparable to the emphasis in the technological world
upon the technique, the process, the m eans, there is for Pollock a
goal beyond the painting act. " When I am painting, I have a general

7

Ernest H emingway, In Our Time (New York : Charles Scribner's Sons,

1925 ), p . 76.
8

West, p . 12.

9 From "My Painting," by Jackson Pollock, published in Possibilities I ,
N. Y. ( Winter, 1947-48 ); quoted from Bryan Robertson, Jackson Pollock (N ew
York: Harry N. Abrams, 1960) .
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notion as to what I am about. I can control the flow of paint: there
is no accident, just as there is no beginning and no end."10
From this view of the work of certain selected major American
artists, work clustered roughly around the years 1930, 1940, and 1950,
it is apparent that the artist was affected by technology, and more
often than not one of the results of this influence was violence in the
art. The two painters, Davis and Pollock, reflect a violence in their
abstractions, non-destructive, to be sure, but still potentially explosive.
And the three writers, Hemingway, West, and Heller, deal directly
with violence as subject matter. Hemingway seems at first to have
an answer in the devotion to the simple, creative act, nearly existential,
if you will, but this may not be sufficient in the end. It certainly is
not for Miss Lonelyhearts in West's novel; Miss Lonelyhearts, in his
role as "humanity lover," tries to go far beyond the level of simple
existentialism, but is frustrated finally, and dies a violent death. And
there cannot really be much hope for Yossarian in Catch-22, another
humanity-lover, who finally has to try to escape to Sweden, in the
manner of Orr, because he is repeatedly blocked in his attempts to
impose his reason and humanness upon a mad, violent world.

Jeremy Mattson
American Thought and Language
Michigan State University

10 From the narration by the artist for the film J.ackson Pollock, 1951 , made
by Hans Namuth and Paul Falkenberg; quoted in Robertson, p . 194.
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Violence and the Arts
Before we consider the relationship between art and a social order
which promotes either violence or nonviolence, it is helpful to consider
the purpose of art in any type of social order. A statement from Picasso-"Art is a lie which makes us realize the truth"-may serve as a
warning that art as a thing-in-itself is difficult to define. One approach
which may help us to identify at least one aspect of the meaning of
art is to see its various roles in society. Albert Guerard in his book
Art for Art's Sake suggests that we may distinguish in art these aspects,
or perhaps three levels.
Art may be perfect adequacy to purpose, the purpose itself
being worthy or not in terms of social welfare; this is the flower
of Utilitarianism, or the Functionalist ideal. Art may be the
sheer joy of living, a gratuitous activity with no thought beyond
itself-folk art, sports, amusements, luxuries. Art may also be
the ba ttle line of the spirit, the venture beyond the law. The
first form of art is service, the second is relaxation, the third
leaves both utility and pleasure behind.I
Let us take each level of art, give an illustration or two from utopian
literature and then see its relationship to the presence of violence or
nonviolence within the social framework.
When art is operational on the first level as a functional, utilitarian expression, it usually finds its inspirational roots in the social
order itself. Whether tha t society promotes attitudes of nonviolence
or violence, it really does not matter to the artist who is producing
functional art. Such an artist becomes the mirror reflecting the mores,
1

Albert L. Guerard, Art for Art's Sake, (New York: Schocken Books, 1963)
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the cultural ideals of that particular society. Plato in the Republic
holds the artist up to the mirror of its social ideal-justice is the
harmonious interaction between the individual and the state. In the
case of this utopia, the artist functions to promote that harmonious
interaction among the social classes-the philosophers, the warriors
and the artisans. The utopian social order of Chairman Mao echoes
the same refrain :

In the world today all culture, all literature and art belong to
definite classes and are geared to definite political lines. There
is in fact no such thing as art for art's sake, art that stands above
classes, art that is detached from or independent of politics.
Proletarian literature and art are part of the whole proletarian
revolutionary cause; they are, as Lenin said, cogs and wheels in
the whole revolutionary machine.2
Our purpose is to ensure that literature and art fit well into the
whole revolutionary machine as a component part, that they
operate as powerful weapons for uniting and educating the
people and for attacking and destroying the enemy, and that
they help the people fight the enemy with one heart and one
mind.3
Art as a component part of a social order becomes a voice which
harmonizes with the political chorus of that society. Whether it be
the promotion of a "masculine mystique" to continue the well-being
of a violent society or an awareness of the "flow of the Tao" which
inspires nonviolent social attitudes, the artist on the first level of
artistic concern is ready to function by means of his talent providing
the "greatest good for the greatest number." B. F. Skinner in his
utopian novel, Wal den .Two, has the same functional value in mind
for artists and their art. By the advanced techniques of behavioral
engineering, we can condition the artist to respond positively to an
environment which is the source of his nourishment. Who knows what
art will be produced when all the negative factors are removed from
the social order? B. F. Skinner's conditioned man may well be the
great artist-perhaps the only artist-of the future.
Art in its second aspect-the expression of the sheer joy of living
with no thought beyond itself--can be illustrated to an extreme by
Aldous Huxley's novel, Brave New World. In this society of the future where the social ideals are conformity, stability and community,
art has became another outlet for a feeling of happiness. The ultimate
ideal of artistic expression in Brave New World is indeed relaxation
along with the immediate gratification which comes with sex and
2 Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (Foreign L anguages Press,
1972) p. 299.
3 Ibid. , p. 301.
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soma. We can all enjoy art as relaxation but to limit it to this level of
mea ning alone is to be vulnerable to the future of a mindless happiness
... the future of Huxley's Braue New World, Orwell's 1984, Zamiatin's We. The option of nonviolence or violence as an ethics of action
is impossible for persons who have become part of some harmonious
ant heap.
The third level of art as the battleline of the Spirit, a venture beyond utility, pleasure and law, involves an appreciation and awareness of transcendence in the life of the artist. Transcendence usually
means to the artist who is nourished by Western culture a confrontation with suffering and struggle. Whether suffering and struggle have
a creative meaning for the artist depends upon the "climate" of his
inner life and not upon the social conditions outside the self. The
climate of social violence or nonviolence has its affect upon the artist
but it is minor compared with that sense of the tragic which the
artist carries within Josephy Brodsky, a Russian poet who recently has
r.ome to America, describes this realization:
A writer is a lonely traveler, and no one is his helper. Society
is always more or less an enemy. Both when it rejects him and
when it accepts him. At any rate, it does both in rather coarse
ways. And not only by force of my own experience, but by force
of the experience I have witnessed around me, I am more and
more convinced that the man in the Bible was right when he
called the earth a "vale of tears." Man, like a mathematical
factor, gains nothing by being moved from one place to another. Tragedy can only be exchanged for tragedy. That is an
old truth. The only thing that makes it contemporary is the
sense of the absurd when you see tragedy's heroes. Just as when
you see its spectators.4
However, the artist who is nurtured by Eastern culture speaks about
the realization of transcendence in a different sense. Although the
21.rtist of the East would agree with his Western counter-part that his
art can never be explained completely in terms of social moresviolent or nonviolent-he would indicate that in his art he has also
transcended the suffering and conflict within the self. Hindu art
represents transcendence over this illusory world by endless images
of gods and goddesses with their abundant appendages of arms, legs
and heads. This world with its suffering and conflict is maya (illusion) and the artist as mystic find liberation (samadhi) through experience not by means of a "realistic" confrontation with social violence or nonviolence. The Taoist artist of China and the Zen Buddhist
artist of Japan represent transcendence by becoming a reflection of
4 Josephy Brodsky, "Says poet Brodsky, ex of the Soviet Union: 'A Writer
is a Lonely Traveler, and No One is his Helper'," New York Times Magazine,
October 1, 1972, p. 87.
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the Way, the Tao, by means of "no-mind" or the "void"-an artistic
mood of being the mirror and not the interpreter of life's meaning.
Can art flourish in a nonviolent or violent society? The answer
to this question must be considered within a broader context-who
is the artist? What is his art? What aspect, what level of artistic concern is being expressed by his art?
Doris Hunter
Humanities
Boston University
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In addressing myself to this question of whether the arts could
flourish in a nonviolent society, I would like, for the purposes of
clarity and simplification, to restrict myself to a discussion of the
relation of physical violence and the arts. There is, of course, such a
thing as psychological or symbolic violence, but it is a kind of violence
which is difficult to define with any reasonable degree of precision.
As I look at the question itself, I find myself somewhat puzzled
and dismayed. Insofar as we are considering possible nonviolent
societies in the future, our discussion can only be hypothetical, perhaps
so hypothetical that none of us could be satified with whatever conclusions we may reach. If we look toward the past, we must admit
that Western civilization, with which we are most familiar, offers no
real examples of a nonviolent society which we might use as a point of
comparison. If we search farther afield, in non-Western civilizations
and in primitive societies, we enter areas that I confess to know
little of and am thus not competent to speak about. Undoubtedly an
anthropologist sensitive to the qualities of art is the man we need, not
a professor of English and American literature.
Having stated these reservations, I still find myself troubled by
the topic. When we try to analyze the importance of violence in the
genesis of works of art in any given period, we are faced with the
almost insurmountable problem of trying to separate this one factor
from many other factors which are closely bound up with it. Mr.
Coffey has mentioned that Holland's greatest period in painting was
the seventeenth century, a time when Holland was constantly fighting
wars, apparently at a much greater rate than was or is customary for
the Dutch. But the seventeenth century was also the period when
Holland was at the height of her commercial expansion and was at
the center of a powerful religious awakening. How are we to isolate
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the violence which accompanied this and other explosive periods and
say that this violence is a crucial and necessary factor in such bursts
of artistic creativity? This difficulty may not be insuperable, but it is
a problem which will be solved only through a close and detailed
examination of the social, political, and cultural history of a specific
age.
To look at the other side of the coin, at a period of violence
which was not a period of great artistic achievement, let us tum to
America in the eighteenth century. Restricting myself to the literature
of that period, I must say tha t the literature of the time, whatever
its merits, could not in general be called great or exceptional. There
are a couple of exceptions, of cours·e, but for such a violent age we
seem to h ave a genuine scarcity of talent. If it is hard to isolate
violence as a crucial factor in an age of artistic brilliance, then what
a re we to do with violent ages which produce little that is greatly
significant in the way of artistic achievement? The least that we can
say is that violence is a very slippery creature; the most that we can
say is that he doesn' t always perform when he should.
As for a future literature in a nonviolent society, I find myself
somewhat optimistic. I admit tha t I have little faith that such a nonviolent society will appear within a ny reasonable length of time, but
if such a society did come into being, I trust that literature would
be able to survive and flourish. To the degree that literature mirrors
the society of the writer, we can reasonably hope that the literature
of a nonviolent age would be neither insipid nor boring because a
fai r amount of our litera ture already gets along quite well with a
minimum of violence. J ane Austen, despite her references to the
N apoleonic W ars, immediately comes to mind, as does Emily Dickinson . The works of such writers are filled with tension and even conflict, but these conflicts, within the characters in Austen's novels and
within the persona in Dickinson's poetry, do not issue in violence.
Whatever may h appen to violence in the future, tension and conflict
will undoubtedly always be with us. They are the heart of literature
but they are also the heart of life, and literature need not fear that
it and life are about to p art company.
Interestingly enough, the trea tment of violence in the literature
of our own age is chan ging in ways which indica te that the relationship of the writer to violence may be changing. The image of war in
modern literature is changing as war itself changes. War, sometimes
celebrated in the past as an occasion for individual heroism, is seen
increasingly as merely an extension of the bureaucratic system. As
warfare becomes increasingly rationalized and mechanized, novels such
as Heller' s Catch 22, M ailer's Th e Naked and the Dead, Dos Passos'
Th ree Soldiers, a nd Hemingway's A Farew ell to Arms tend to treat
war as an impersonal and unheroic process that threatens to stifle any
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individual courage or freedom. Modem collective violence is by its
very nature indifferent to individuals, since the victim is often a mere
statistic to the victimizer and since the victimizer himself is often
operating only as a cog in the machine, a man detached from any
feelings towards the victim, merely "following orders."1 Given this
new form of violence, it is not surprising that writers show little
interest in glorifying war or in celebrating what might pass for heroism
in other circles.
At the same time, however, there is another trend in modem
literature which might make us somewhat less optimistic. In reaction
against this impersonal collective violence and against the stultifying
society which produces such violence, some writers have become
fascinated with individual violence as a means of rebellion against
society. In the work of Norman Mailer, personal violence, individual
violence which is both outside the law and the approval of society,
becomes a way to test the courage and resources of the individual
and also a means by which the individual achieves a more open and
free existence than contemporary society normally allows. This literary
interest does not necessarily imply an endorsement of individual violence, although admittedly the case is not a closed one with Mailer.
The fascination with personal violence on the part of Mailer and
other contemporary writers is more than anything else a sign of their
desperation about contemporary society; the violence is the literary
counterpart of their feelings of despair and helplessness. For those
who find such a fascination obnoxious, we can hold out the hope that
individual violence will undergo the same process of deromanticization
that has happened to the image of war. By forcing us to confront
the issue of individual violence, these writers may paradoxically aid
us in such a process. The more that we learn about individual violence,
the less likely are we to see it as romantic or interesting. The literary
image may have been presented to us so that we can transcend it;
the image achieves its purpose through our negation of it.
Now I am well aware that a discussion of the literary treatment
of violence takes us away from the question of the relation of violence
to the creation of literature. Violence, if nothing else, at least gives
the writer something to write against. I can't help but feel, however,
that this changing image of collective violence indicates a change in
the attitudes of writers and their societies towards war. War is becoming too dangerous and too impersonal for anyone to take joy in
it. In the future, war may become the ultimate symbol of boredom
and routine, and the occasions of war may prove to be periods of
widespread artistic sterility. Even in our own time wars tend to create
a hiatus in artistic activity; violence seems to be more easily dealt with
artistically in the aftermath of war. If writers in some future non-
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violent society want to write about violence, we will have left them
enough actual examples in case their imaginations fail them.
My brief discussion of the literary treatment of violence also points
to another consideration which might be important in a more detailed
examination of this problem, namely, that there are fundamentally
different kinds of violence and that these differences in types of
violence must be considered in examining the relation of violence and
art. A detailed study of this particular relation must not only attempt
to isolate violence from other possible influences; it must also try
to isolate different kinds of violence and their respective influences.
Finally, let me end this brief argument with a plea that we look
at art as something more than the sum of the influences that lead to
its creation. Art is more than a passive mirror of the environment. It
is, as Ms. Hunter noted, an achievement which transcends its environment. If I have turned towards specific works of art from possible
solutions to this question, it is because I believe that it is towards the
works themselves that we owe our main allegiance. This allegiance
should be such that we admit that we are in no position to say what
the future possibilities of art are. If we were in such a position, there
would be no need for any more artists.

Robert Golden
College of General Studies
Rochester Institute of Technology

NOTES
!Frederick J. Hoffman, in his The Mortal No: Death and the
Modern Imagination (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964),
discusses the rise of this impersonal violence and the various reactions
to it, including the cult of personal violence.
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Violence and General Education
Americans are suckers. They are not born that way; they are
made stupid by their parents, their priests, their politicians, their
proprietors, and their pedagogues. Each of these, in his institutional
role, desires control of people, and thus it is in his interest to make
people controllably stupid. The chief ingredient in such control and
such stupidity is ideology-about which I shall have more to say in
a moment. Suffice it to say here that I value general education chiefly
as an instrument for thwarting the ideological control of my students
by the various institutional agents. And since "law and order" is
lately a favorite phrase of proprietors, presidents, and professors, this
is a good place to start thwarting.
By ideology I mean any expression that disguises a wish or command under a semblance of fact by the use of a metaphysical term.
"Women were meant to be wives and mothers," says Archie Bunker,
that great repository of ideological expressions. "The policeman is
our friend," say Dick and Jane, another great repository. And Richard
Nixon, surely the greatest repository of all, says: "We are ending the
war." Such formulae, properly internalized, are a very efficient means
of social control, since the victim does not know he is under control.
He thinks that he has knowledge, facts, education-that he is autonomous man making his own decisions based on the simple facts.
The language of law, crime, justice, and rights is so thoroughly
ideological that I would reserve it for the training of professional
casuists-lawyers, theologians, politicians, and used car salesmenwho would consciously adopt it for the purpose of deception. My
general education student, however, would learn how the casuistic
game operates and how to set up an isolated channel of d ecision-
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m aking not based on casuistic language. This student will know that
powerful people don't like certain actions--especially actions which
threaten their power-and that they label such actions "crimes." He
will understand why, when he kills people they want killed, he is a
hero; but when he kills people they don't want killed, he is a criminal.
That's ideology at work.
Ideology colors the perception of violence, so that the status quo
is pictured as peaceful while change appears violent. In the utopian
variant, the status quo is seen as violent but the future state nonviolent. If I concentrate here on the violence of the status quo, it
is because the dominant institutions, in socializing my typical state
college student, have rendered this violence ideologically invisible.
I merely remind you of the violence of the status quo; I did not
discover it. Many before me have noted the fact that if I support
the bombing of the Vietnamese people I am called lawful, orderly,
and peace-loving, no matter how many people I kill. But if I bomb
the bombers, I am a violent outlaw.
On the domestic scene, I take part in the systematic and legal
killing of 55,000 people each year by means of the automobile, and
I do so gladly because the alternative is giving up my car. But I
disguise my violence under the ideological word, "accident." Thus
insulated, I can happily participate in the lethal automotive system.
But if I were to kill 50,000 people i~ a campaign of terror to paralyze
the automotive social system, that would be called senseless violence.
I am a relatively comfortable beneficiary of a system of health
care delivery which systematically excludes and thereby condemns to
early death a whole segment of the American population-that segment
lacking power in wealth with which to demand health services. I am
kept comfortable in my privilege by the ideology of property: I say,
" I can afford it and they can't," and that makes death legal and
peaceful and orderly. But if I undertake to redistribute the power
to compete for medical services, by transferring wealth from the
possessors to the non-possessors, the possessors will call the cops and
brand my actions violent and illegal.
It is easier for us to see both the violence and the ideology in
classic historical cases, such as that of slavery in the United States.
Here is a letter from a slave-owner to her runaway slave:
. . . I write you these lines to let you know the situation
we are in,-partly in consequence of your running away and
stealing Old Rock, our fine mare. Though we got the mare
back, she was never worth much after you took her ;-and, as I
now stand in need of some funds, I have determined to sell
you, and I have had an offer for you, but did not see fit to take
it. If you will send me a thousand dollars, and pay for the old
mare, I will give up all claim to you .... If you do not com147

ply with my request, I will sell you to someone else, and you
may rest assured that the time is not far distant when things
will be changed with you . . . . I would like to know if you
read your Bible. If so, can you tell what will become of the
thief if he does not repent? I deem it unnecessary to say much
more at present . . . . You know that we reared you as we
reared our own children . . . .
Today we find such ideological blindness so incredible that we
don't know whether to laugh or cry. But we have our own current
refinement of the classic on our attitude toward institutional racism.
Here we utilize our special historicist notion of the past, in which we
readily admit past violence but note with relief that all that is over
and done with. Today we start the race afresh: you on the bottom and
I on top. As Archie Bunker put it to Sammy Davis, Jr.: "I want to
tell you, I was always dead set against slavery."
In this era when technology transforms the world at an accelerating
pace, offering us ever-larger magnitudes of potential disaster, it is
questionable whether my students can survive the next fifty years if
they remain in the grip of the traditional orthodoxies, the folk knowledge, the myths which allow the same elites to retain control. Only
if my students are trained to order their priorities and test their predictions free of the covert command and metaphysical traps of
ideological language-only then can they see the alternative options
open to them. The ambient status quo is, after all, merely one violent
option. There are many alternatives- none without violence, perhaps,
but also not necessarily suicidal. That's the kind of alternative I want
my students ready to see.
Alan Downes
St. Cloud College
Interdisciplinary Studies
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THE QUESTION OF LAW AND ORDER
IN SOCIAL SCIENCE EDUCATION
A. Methodology

Since the law and order syndrome is often a highly emotional issue in the United States today, "committed" teachers may be tempted
to treat the subject more in the manner of indoctrination rather than
education. This distinction is important because indoctrination propagates a one-sided point of view based upon one-sidedly selected data.
Indoctrination tries to convert and commit people to a particular
viewpoint. If we claim to pursue education, we must give our students
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all the evidence needed and available: both the evidence which supports our personal point of view and the evidence which contradicts
it. Moreover, we must show all the principal alternatives for action and
leave the students free to draw their own conclusions. This does not
mean, however, that educators may not express their personal points
of view as long as they are labeled as such and do not take the place
of the crucial function of a reasonably comprehensive and objective
analysis.

B. Steps of Analysis
l. Clarification of Terms

In analyzing the relationship between law and order, we find
that a free society can have neither order without the rule of law, nor
law without orderly processes of government. The extent, moreover,
to which a free society may achieve law and order is closely dependent
upon its commitment to justice and peace.
In searching for the essential characteristics of law without which
it ceases to be law we find that law always produces a status quo
which only new legislation can change and that law must be obeyed by
a ll individuals in the lawmaker's jurisdiction including those who are
dissatisfied with the law or even suffer disadvantages from it.
2. Empirical Evidence

In applying the fairness principle to our inquiry into law and order,
we should first confront our students with an overall account of the
record of crime and disorder in our country. Thereafter, as complement and corrective, we should also explain the intricate problems
involved in accumulating accurate crime statistics. The dimensions
of the evidence are bound to impress students and to elicit questions
about causes and remedies.
3. Causes
The causes for law violation can be found m the behavior of the
violators, in the law, in its enforcement, or in combinations of these
factors.
a. Types of Law Violators
Among those who violate the law, several principal types of motivations can be distinguished:
( 1) those who do not claim to be opposed to the law but whose
offenses are due to socially harmful behavior, such as hate,
greed, lack of self-control, negligence, etc.;
(2) those who defy the law when it puts them at a disadvantage
and, therefore, consider their violations as corrective or even
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necessary acts;
( 3) those who oppose the law in principle and therefore view their
violations as acts of protest;
and
( 4) those recidivists who claim that the prevailing correctional
practices do not permit them to reintegrate themselves into
society and thus force them into renewed offenses.
b. Types of Dissatisfaction with the Law
Dissatisfaction with the law is usually caused by one or a combination of the following grievances:
( 1) that the law has been imposed against the wishes of the
majority;
(2) that it favors one segment of the people over another;
(3) that it is too difficult to revise or repeal it;
( 4) that it is not enforced even-handedly among all segments
of society;
and
( 5) that the penalties imposed upon violators impede rather than
promote their rehabilitation.
History has abundantly shown that the patience of the disadvantaged has too often been strained to the point where they ignored
or openly violated the law even though the odds were hopelessly
stacked against them. The extent, however, to which different individuals and groups have been willing to tolerate what they conceived
to be injustice varied greatly.
c. The Social Climate for Law Violation
In the United States, a combination of national characteristics
seems to make it somewhat more likely than elsewhere that the
disadvantaged and dissatisfied militate against the law.
( 1) Compared to most other developed countries, the United
States suffers from particularly wide disparities between the
most advantaged and the most disadvantaged groups.
(2) Our political system provides for relatively slow processes of
adjustment in all phases of government, legislative, executive,
and judicial.
( 3) Our laws are often enforced selectively in favor of the advantaged groups. In addition, white-collar criminals are considerably more difficult to detect than blue-collar criminals.
( 4) Our correctional practices are still failing, in the majority of
all cases, to rehabilitate the criminal law violators and to reintegrate them into life outside prison walls.
(5) From the colonial rebellions, the Revolutionary War and
the Civil War, through race riots and violent labor unrest,
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to the burnings, bombings, and the non-violent disobedience
of our time, victims and foes of the social system have used
law violation as a deliberate show of opposition. While the
growing complexity of the decision-making process tends to
discourage lawful opposition, modem techniques of mass
organization are bolstering large-scale civil disturbances and
hit-and-run terrorism against the establishment.
4. Remedies
How can soC1et1es best achieve an optimum of law and order?
The answers to this question vary greatly.
On the most superficial level, we hear that social order depends
simply on the inculcation and enforcement of obedience to the existing
laws. Others insist that the response to the law depends largely on
its fair and equitable administration. Many social scientists find that
the laws themselves must first be fair and equitable before all groups
of society will equally respect it. Marxists deny the possibility of law
and order in any society which does not conform to their design. To
them, law and order in capitalist societies cannot emerge from the
gradual amelioration of the laws and their enforcement but only
from a radical revamping of the economic and political power
structure.
In comparing these approaches to law and order, it can easily be
shown that each of them has some validity and could help lessen the
incidence of crime and disorder. In contemporary America, however,
the need for the revision of unfair laws and the reform of law enforcement seems so urgent that it may merit the highest priority
among the various measures needed.
Although we do not know how far institutional change can contribute toward the reduction of crime and disorder, the available evidence indicates that "good laws make it easier to do right and harder
to do wrong" (William E. Gladstone). The highest crime rates in the
United States are in the urban slums where housing is sub-standard,
unemployment high, education insufficient, and poverty endemic.
Black p eople have long constituted the most disadvantaged group in
American society and show the highest rates of crime against persons
and property.
The Committee for Economic Development, a businessmen's organization, recently described the relationship between law and justice
in America as follows:
"Much bitterness and dissatisfaction stem from the widespread
conviction that American criminal codes and their administration are unfair, inequitable, and-in a word-unjust. The sense
of justice is a basic human need. Any society rests upon insecure foundations if it contains major elements that believe its
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laws and the manner of their administration are unjust. Yet,
injustice does exist; there is discriminatory enforcement of unpopular laws, police corruption, inordinate court delay, and
brutality in the prisons."
Nobody has yet disproven that injustices and other inadequacies
in our social order constitute the main cause of crime and disorder.
The national response, therefore, would call primarily for changes in
the law and only secondarily for disciplinary action against the violators. For a society which is to be built upon justice rather than
force, the first priority in the pursuit of social order must necessarily be
the development of just laws justly administered, including correctional methods which aim at rehabilitation rather than retribution.
It seems to be one of the most pervasive paradoxes of the human
condition that people are quick to denounce crime and disorder but
slow to recognize and combat the underlying causes. Very often the
necessary adjustments require substantial sacrifices which do not find
majority support. Governments all over the world have less trouble
raising billions of dollars for the fight against individual and international aggression but usually find it impossible to get the same sums
for preventive measures.
Social science knows that antisocial and antilegal behavior is
learned. H ence, the fundamental remedy for crime and misdemeanors
must be sought in education and the institutions which contribute to
it. Nobody, however, can facilitate the work of education as much as
the law because it embodies "the moral sentiment of the people"
(William Blackstone).

Wolf D. Fuhrig
Political Science
MacMurray College

0000
Three assumptions underlie the thoughts which follow. The first
is simply that law and order must prevail or civilization will cease
to exist.
The second assumption is that law and order is a changing, dynamic
element in a culture. An element which may, to a degree, be constant
in its basic characteristics, but very much different in its specifics from
time to time and from place to place.
The third and most important assumption is that law and order
must be sustained by a willingness on the part of the people to live

152

by it. The alternative is a form of police state within which democracy
and freedom cannot exist.
Accepting these assumptions, one might then conclude that a
democratic society must be founded on a system of law and order
which can be changed by orderly process and which is willingly
accepted by the people as the guide to and standard of a healthy
co-existence.
With this as the objective, what then should general education
do to contribute to realizing that objective?
First of all, general education-which I consider to include all
levels of education-must satisfy a very practical and of the moment
necessity ... namely that of teaching and sustaining obedience.
In the early years of life one must learn what law is and one must
learn to obey it-if even blindly. Obedience must be demanded in
many situations and education must serve this end.
As one grows older, however, what once may have been blind
obedience must be converted to thoughtful respect and understanding.
Even a minimally educated man in our complex civilized society will
not long support or live by that which restricts his freedom and for
which there seems to be no explanation. For developing this understanding and respect the burden will increasingly fall to education,
and the colleges and universities must assume their share of that
responsibility.
At this point one might ask if making good citizens should not be
the business of the elementary and secondary schools and that general
education in college should be a cut above this in purpose. To that
I would respond in the negative. To convert childlike obedience to
mature compliance requires the cultivation of understanding and
respect on an adult level and that is no small task even for higher
education.
A second major role of general education regarding the question
of law and order is one of providing the machinery for the changes
which must be made. If the law and order of today is very much
changed from what it was in our grandparents day-and I believe it
is-how did the changes come about? To answer by saying our legislatures changed the laws, our enforcement agencies function differently,
and our courts interpret the law differently would be to see only the
top of the iceberg. Vast, complex machinery for change lies below
this surface. Our political party system, our courts, our law making
bodies on many levels, and our enforcement agencies, all are major
wheels in this machine. But, in addition, there are the many social
agencies, business interests, public and private concerns in countless
numbers, all of which provide some small or large measure of the
push and pull which affect the workings of that machine. It is not
sufficient to prepare the professionals as functionaries of change, we
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must also prepare an educated people who, if they are to be participants in their government, must have some understanding of how
this machine was built and how it can be made to operate in the best
interest of society.
The third major role for general education is to provide the
cultural base upon which law and order is established.
The laws which govern a society must be threads in the fabric of
that society-they must grow out of the accepted values and standards
held by the people. We see many laws which, for one reason or another,
are not expressions of social values and these laws are inevitably forgotten or commonly violated by a major segment of society. The later
years of that great experiment called µrohibition stands as a classic
example of widespread violation of a law no longer in accord with
the public attitude of what is right and wrong.
Many of the laws which are being violated or questioned today
are those which are most deeply rooted in the White Judeo-Puritan
heritage which formed their base. Could it be that we are a somewhat
less White Judeo-Puritan society and those laws are no longer threads
in our social fabric?
If general education is a major contributor to the weaving of the
cultural fabric-and it certainly is or we are wasting our time herethen it most assuredly contributes to the formation of the cultural base
upon which order is built and from which laws emerge. It is here,
in that third role, that general education performs its most important
function and it is here that we can speculate on the long range results
of the decisions we make in developing general education programs.
We might ask what would happen if our general education excludes
that which would help us understand the needs, customs, and values
of other racial or ethnic groups. Will we someday again be legislating
to the disadvantage of these groups or at best, be fighting a losing
battle to enforce the laws which uphold their rights? Such a battle is
bound to be lost if those laws cease to be a thread in the cultural fabric.
What would happen if general education leaves out the study of
our heritage? Will history degenerate-in the minds of the majorityto a set of vague tales and fables, no longer clearly able to provide
us the guidance which many claim it must provide if we are to bring
order into the lives of man. Without this guidance will a less well
informed and less mature public support precipitous changes in our
system of law-a kind of legalistic situation-ethic which, carried to
sufficient extreme, is comparable to no law and order at all.
What would be the reward for provincialism in our general education? Can urban society ignore the rural and still survive? Can we
bus our problems from one national neighborhood to another and
claim to have solved them?
What would result if our general education neglects to expose the
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student to the arts? Will government support for the arts-which
seems to be their only chance for survival---drop to the bottom of
our list of priorities? Lacking the sense of balance which the arts
provide in a culture, can order long prevail? What would result from
the loss of opportunity for individual and collective expression or the
decline of the value of that expression to society?
What has been the effect of ignoring the applied arts-that realm
of human activity so often thought to be unworthy of inclusion in
general education? We now have a race of supposedly educated
people, living in a world saturated with business, industry, the home,
physical recreation and activity, practical and applied skills, about
which we know little. This is a major segment of the picture of modern living over which higher education has placed a veil. Is this not
also a part of our cultural base-a thread in the fabric?
I will not attempt to answer these questions I have raised, that
is not my purpose. I only wish to use them to suggest that their
a nswers affect general education which in turn significantly influences
the future development of values and standards. And it is from those
values and standards that our system of law and order will emerge.
We have then, three ways in which general education should
approach the issue of law and order: It should help educate people
to live with it as it is-good or bad-lest they destroy themselves in
lawlessness and chaos. It should help educate people to be participants in the processes whereby laws are changed, for without change
they cannot express the true values of a changing society. And, finally,
general education must help educate the people which make up the
culture-the collective conscience-from which will flow the kind of
law which need not be forced on them, but which they will live by
willingly.

J.

Warren Brinkman
General Education
Kansas State Teachers College
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Although the phrasing has varied, the major question raised by
liberal education has always been the question of identity: who am I?
The question is as old as human history, but that is no reason to go
on answering it in the old way. That is exactly what we have done,
however; hence it should not be surprising that the ideal of a liberal
education has become attractive to fewer and fewer persons.
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The question of identity is too important to be left up to a medieval approach to human nature, an approach that elevates thought at
the expense of feeling. Look at the sacred phrases used by proponents
of liberal education and this bias becomes clear: "life of the mind,"
"intellectual culture," "rational discourse." These are not bad concepts, but they are not the whole story. People, especially young people
who are between 18 and 23, do more than think. Phrases like "life of
the mind" keep alive a mind/body dichotomy that may have worked
for Aristotle, Aquinas and Newman, but which is no longer appropriate as a model of human nature. It withers when examined in light of
recent advances in psychiatry, psychology, sociology and anthropology.
Unfortunately, nothing in the antiquated process which certifies
persons to teach at the college level has anything at all to do with
advances in those fields, unless one happens to be taking a Ph.D. in
one of them. Graduate education is modeled on an outdated view of
human nature, a view which lauds intellect but fears emotion, which
celebrates order, neatness and symmetry but fears their opposites. So
naturally undergraduate institutions act the same way.
Armed with these perceptions, it is easy to explain the current
disaffection from the aims and practices of liberal education: they
do not connect to the student personally. As a person, he has more
needs than can be satisfied by cognitive learning. He is a personsomeone who thinks-but also someone who falls in and out of love,
who worries about what others think of him, who fears his father,
who experiences anxiety and loneliness, who wonders which values to
pick up and which to discard. He is, in sum, fairly complicated. These
concerns I have enumerated need to play a role in our learning strategies if we are serious about the riddle of identity, the riddle of liberal
education. The answer to it is liberating, but how can we answer it?
Harold Taylor has raised the same concern recently in How To
Change Colleges (197 1):
It seems to me to be odd that in all the recent concern
shown by government commissions and educational study
groups with the existence of student unrest it seems not to have
occurred to the educators to see what could be done by the
simple device of taking the education of students in all the dimensions of their need-political, aesthetic, intellectual, social,
and personal-with a seriousness at least equal to theirs. (70)
Sadly, we are not prepared to deal with students on these new
levels. Our training had nothing to do with those concerns. But here
are some suggestions for getting us going in the right direction:
1. Recognize the problem. As John Hersey put it in his Letter
To The Alumni (1970):
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A pressing question for our univers1t1es, which had better
start at least thinking about feeling before they are engulfed by
anti-intellectualism coming at them from two sides-from their
own students and from the philistines: Why is this country so
open to one set of emotions and their expression-rage, hatred,
scorn, put-downs, vituperation, vicious criticism, characterkilling; and so suspicious of, so hostile to, another-love, kindness, generosity, forgiveness, trust, praise, encouragement? (36)
2. Admit that courses have their limitations, and that development of the whole person-a hallowed phrase if ever there was onemay require more than curricular gimmickry. It may have more to
do with living conditions and governance patterns than with what
goes on in a classroom. We will probably have to take ourselves less
seriously as classroom persons.
3. Learn to live with the fact that one's whole person is not done
developing at the end of four years. In that sense, a liberal education
is only a beginning, and, like all growth processes, will require attention now and then.
4. Faculty, like students, are capable of continued development;
hence there ought to be arrangements made so this will take place,
not simply because faculty stand to gain, but because students will
gain too. The key to student growth is faculty growth. Curricular
development must involve faculty development. Many curricular revisions fail because too little was done in the way of faculty development before the new program began.
Joseph Katz has spoken recently about faculty development in an
address entitled "The Challenge to 'Body of Knowledge' Learning
From Person-Centered Advocates":
Professors have rarely received, in graduate school or
through in-service training, the kind of preparation that they
need for the pedagogical task of facilitating and assessing student learning. But perhaps the ultima te reason why professors
cannot respond to the challenge of inducing learning is that
they have no adequate sense of how this is to be accomplished.
(Liberal Education, May, 1972, p. 144.)
My colleagues and I recently completed a research project involving in-depth interviews with 24 faculty in three midwestern liberal
arts colleges. Sponsored by the Buhl Foundation, the investigation
gave us a close look at the learning/ teaching repertoires of the sample
faculty. The faculty interviewed were remarkably alike in the ways
they learned to teach. For some, an undergraduate or graduate
professor had served as a model. For others, the trial and error method
was emphasized. Others insisted teaching was an extension of their
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personality, not subject to external influence. In most cases, however,
this was a difficult topic to discuss initially because they had never
talked about it in any depth. Equally obvious was their interest in
exploring the subject further once the ice had been broken. Time and
time again, the interviewers were struck by the faculty's openness in
answering the questions on learning and teaching. Several persons,
for example, told us that they had never gone as deeply into these
matters before, and that they found the interview very helpful personally. It was as if their feelings had been bottled up until we came
along. Their own institutions had usually not given them assistance
in improving their teaching. Their colleagues had not been particularly helpful either. While they were not able to say what should be
done, many of the faculty said they thought something should be
done. We agreed.
5. If the whole person is to be developed, alterations in governance
structures may be in order. Charles Frankel stated in Education and
the Barricades ( 1968) :
Students desire to have an education whose character and
purposes they can understand. And students believe they would
have a better chance to get such an education if they had more
chance to take part in designing it, and more chance to understand, through the hard, practical experience of active participation, how the institution to which they belong is governed.
This desire and this belief are both reasonable. To want to have
something to say about the conditions under which one's community lives is an impulse that educational institutions should
wish to encourage. ( 88-89)
6. New learning models, especially models that feature groups of
students working together at tasks, will have to spread to more institutions. Ask anyone who has made extensive use of group-oriented
learning strategies: something special happens; students and faculty
enjoy themselves and they learn. Not a bad combination. The riddle
of identity is surely not solved by individuals working apart from one
another. Group learning allows the individual to borrow the strengths
of other people. It also gives persons who need extra support an opportunity to find it in the people around them.
Other models-interdisciplinary courses, problem-oriented approaches, cluster colleges, off-campus programs, and the like-are by
now fairly widely used, although they are by no means universal.
7. Liberal education requires a coherent philosophy of education
where none exists now. Harold Taylor has pointed that out in Ho w
To Change Colleges (1971):
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What is wrong with the university as a teaching institution
is precisely this: it has no philosophy of education, no unifying
principle around which reforms can be made, either to meet the
problems of student unrest or to engage the students in their
own learning.
It has instead a system of administrative conveniences. The
whole apparatus of departments, divisions, institutes, lectures,
research, grades, examinations, academic credits, classes and
faculty appointments is based on an administrative plan for
dealing with student and academic subject matter, not on a
philosophy. (67)
That new philosophy is education for human development. It
takes the broad view of human nature and finds man's intellect only
one of his distinguishing marks. It takes human nature too seriously
to try to stuff it into an old uniform where all the ribbons were earned
for thinking. It borrows heavily from recent advances in the social
sciences and points to Nevitt Sanford's The American College as the
earliest attempt to view the college itself from those vantage points. In
the words of the Hazen Report, The Student In Higher Education
(1968):
By the very fact that it presumes to inform the minds of
the young, the college becomes involved in the development of
the whole person, of which the intellectual faculties are but a
part. The time has come for the college to realize the extent of
its power to influence personality development and to take full
responsibility for the way this power is executed. (6)
Here are some of the things the developmental philosophy of education says, if I may borrow the useful summary made recently by
Joseph Katz:
1. Students learn if their studies connect both with motivation
and with aspirations, among them achievement of personal
identity, occupational identity, a satisfactory life style, a sense
of competence.
2. There must be self-direction in the student's process of learning and he must have autonomous participation in the
planning and execution of what he does.
3. The student's learning must issue in a product that has its
own self-contained integrity and must be more than make
believe or a testing hurdle.
4. The student's work must be useful to himself and, wherever
possible, useful to others. This contrasts with situations in
which the primary product for the student is a grade which
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may or may not be an ornament on his record and a career
token but which has few other consequences.
5. Learning is facilitated when students learn in groups which
are oriented to a common task and in which what is found
out is mutually complementary.
6. The professor or other adults must be interested in the student's work and convey this through task-minded encouragement and evaluations.
7. The professor himself must treat the subject matter in an
inquiring mood and he must be interested in the subject
matter he is teaching.
8. There must be no neglect of other developmental tasks that
students face during their passage through college-such
tasks as the achievement of self-esteem, of competence, of
acceptance by and integration with others, and many
more. If obstacles are put in the way of the achievement of
these tasks, the effect is one of depressing the student's
willingness to learn. (Liberal Education, May 1972, p. 142)
What better way is there to approach the question of identity
posed by liberal education?

John Noonan
Liberal Studies
Findlay College

0000===

160

Lio

Strange Bed£ellows:
Academic Freedom and Violence
The crisis of misunderstanding still reigns in academia! The more
responsive the public has been in providing and expanding educational opportunities the more the universities seem to be threatened
by hostile forces and instability. It is paradoxical that the more universities attempt to ward off these hostilities, the more they tend to
perpetuate them.
Although we are at the present time experiencing some relief from
the violence of student unrest, the American society, especially the
most formally educated part of it, seems to be even more confused
than usual. On practically every campus in America, learned professors who vociferously decried the student's use of strikes as a means
of gaining power are arguing in the same breath for the use of collective bargaining and the threat of strikes as a means of gaining power
for themselves. More than ever, professors, cdllege administrators and
trustees are paying lip service to the idea of academic freedom, but
are simultaneously surrendering without conscience the functions which
are inseparable from academic freedom. The ideal of finding truth is
being matched, and perhaps overmatched, by the practice of exercising power, and the ideal of seeking truth is not only being paralleled
by the practice of seeking power but it is also being mocked by the
malpractice of seeking money. Never has one had better cause to appreciate the cogency of Russelil Kirk's observation that academic freedom is really desired only by a few men, and that a considerable part
of the modern clerisy has neither the true desire for it, nor the true
right to it.
His statement is harsh, yet truth is often harsh. Most of us, faculty
as well as students, have now and then been struck by the realization
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that a great many professors do not want academic freedom for themselves and certainly not for others. Their only interest is in larger
salaries, the security of tenure and the right to complacency. These
professors become concerned about academic freedom only when there
appears to be some threat that their monopoly of indoctrinating students with their own prejudices may be impaired; they have no respect for the student's freedom of mind nor for those of their colleagues who might differ with them.
Is it any wonder then that some observers feel that the previous
student unrest was caused by members of the faculty? These same
observers contend that we are experiencing a period of relative calm
on college campuses today because faculty members are beginning to
fear for their jobs. Recent events in the field of higher education tend
to bear out these suspicions. The financial crunch, threats against
tenure and other pressures, external as well as internal, have created for faculty a climate of fear and this climate of fear is turning
faculty members into "cringing automatons" incapable of exercising
any aspect of their academic freedom.
Today as the nation becomes more polarized, as our inner tensions
grow more desperate, and as our frustrations with our own country
and with the world become more embittered, we must exert every
effort to protect and strengthen civility against the impulses of
destruction.
In this effort a special responsibility rests on the intellectual community. The intellectual community should be the principal custodian of the life of reason. It should be the perennial champion of
discipline and restraint. It should be the absolute enemy of violence.
Nothing is more dismaying than the way in which a few in the intellectual community have rejected the process of reason and have succumbed to the national susceptibility for violence and have indeed
begun themselves to exalt violence.
No one would suggest that the intellectual community is responsible for the atrocities committed at home and abroad. But one can
suggest that they have contributed to the atmosphere which has begun
to accept and almost legitimize violence. One can suggest that they
are reinforcing the assault on civility and hastening the decomposition
of the American social process.
Whatever constriction of academic freedom that has come to pass
in recent years because of faculty timidity, none can compare with
that same faculty's rejection of the process of reason. The freedom
to reason and to seek the truth are the basic components of academic
freedom. Academic freedom is more than merely the right of the
professor to pursue research and teaching. It implies the obligation to
promote learning. Aside from pursuing his own learning, the professor
must promote learning in an absolute sense. He must protect every-
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thing conducive to learning and fight everything detrimental to it.
If learning is prevented by violence on the part of the professors, then
those professors must be fought. If learning is prevented by violence
on the part of the students, then those students must be fought.
The mere requirement that students strictly observe the university
order does not preclude student protest. (By definition, universities are
places of protest!) Aiming at the discovery of truth and the advancement of learning which are sometimes in opposition to the status quo,
universities are places of protest against existing achievement. Student
participation in that protest, much as it may be directed toward their
professors and administrators, is a prerequisite for a true and effective
university. Students can protest if they feel the university does not
fulfill its contractual obligations. While this would be difficult to prove
because university catalogues often reserve the right to change, there
still may be cause for legal protest. It is quite conceivable that once
the educational contract has been entered students might want to
change it and the university might want to go along. In this case, the
university must examine whether the change is desired by all of the
students or just a fraction. If a majority of students protest for change,
the university must not go along unless the change is agreeable also
to the minority of students. Otherwise, the university would not fulfill its contractual obligations to the minority. A protest by the minority should only be followed if the majority approve.
Whether they constitute a minority or a majority of the student
body, protesters have no right to impose their will upon their nonprotesting fellow students. Whatever student protests there are and
for whatever reasons they are undertaken, they must not interfere with
learning.
Protests against the university are justified only if they are provoked by the university. No matter how much universities may be involved in war research (something academic freedom entitles them
to do), they cannot be blamed for the foreign policy of the President
of the United States. The failure of the two major political parties to
nominate presidential candidates who are to the liking of the New
Left, much as it may justify protest against these parties, does not justify university strikes which deprive fellow students of the instruction
to which they are entitled. Failures of the American Federal Government do not justify riots in universities which are not under federal
but state control. The independence of American Universities being
what it is, such failures would probably not justify action against them
even if they were controlled by the Federal Government.
Student protest occupies a minimal although significant part of the
multifarious array of societal difficulties. Poverty, racial strife, pollution and the apparent decline in the whole quality of life are equally
important and each of these has the potential of provoking in our
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society a climate of violence. These problems affect all of society not
simply colleges and universities. Yet these institutions must hold our
greatest hopes, they must be places of objective inquiry for the solutions of society's problems. In order to accomplish this herculean task,
the universities must, through reason, restore internal order. Once order
is restored, academic freedom will again blossom. In lieu of riots and
a climate of violence that lead youth into confusion, universities must
begin to fulfill their ultimate mission and lead youth into clarity.

Glenda Lawhorn
General Studies Division
Southern Illinois University
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